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INDIANA LAW JOURN.4L
while a desire to be relieved of responsibility, a desire to discharge moral
obligations, or a purpose to carry out a previously adopted policy of making
gifts during his lifetime indicate a purpose predominately associated with
life.1 6
A review of the decisions indicates that the federal courts have been
extremely reluctant to hold that a gift inter vivos has been made "in con-
templation of death". In nearly all cases upholding the tax the court has
been aided by the statutory provision that gifts made within two years prior
to death are presumed to have been made "in contemplation of death".17
Where gifts made more than two years prior to death have been taxed, the
facts indicating a predominant motive associated with death have been very
clear' 8 or uncontested.19
The principal case held that there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals. While it is in accord with the
rules of law stated in prior decisions it shows that the reluctance of the lower
courts to hold gifts as being made "in contemplation of death" is shared to a
considerable extent by the nation's highest court. If it is desirable to tax all
transfers where the donee receives benefits only on the death of the donor
as part of his gross estate it appears that an amendment to the statute will
be required. 20  E. 0. C.
TAXATIoN-TAX STATUS OF WILL CONTESTANTS-INFLUENCE OF STATE LAW
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL TAX STATTEs.-Petitioner, the grandson
of testatrix, who bequeathed certain small legacies to her heirs and the entire
residuary estate to a trustee for an endowment trust for a charity, began a
will contest which ended in a compromise agreement. Suit was brought to
recover income tax, assessed on amount obtained by the compromise. Peti-
tioner contended that it was not income under the Sixteenth Amendment, and
if income under the amendment was exempt under the exemption of property
received by "inheritance." Held: that such property comes under exemption
of "inheritance." Lyeth v. Hoey (1938), 59 S. Ct. 155.
The Supreme Court after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment defined
taxable income as that "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
16 Updike v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1937), 88 F. (2d) 807;
United States v. Wells (1931), 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446.
17 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (c). The statutory presumption was overcome in
the Wells case because the motive was to carry out a policy long followed
of making liberal gifts to his children during his lifetime. 283 U. S. 102,
119; 51 S. Ct. 446. But where the donor transferred $670,000 in trust and
the same day disposed of the remaining $13,000 of his property by will the
Supreme Court held that being 78 years old, unusually vigorous and clear
minded, and in good health was not enough to overcome the presumption
and held that the estate was taxable. McCaughin v. Real Estate Land Title
and Trust Co. (1936), 197 U. S. 606, 56 S. Ct. 604.
18 Oliver v. Bell (1938), 23 F. Supp. 30. Deceased was 99 years, 11
months, 11 days old at his death. He had divided his property among his
children two and one-half years before and made his will two days later.
The same persons witnessed both the will and the gift instrument. The
same persons were beneficiaries and received the same proportions under
both instruments.
19 Milliken v. United States (1931), 283 U. S. 15, 51 S. Ct. 324.
20 Helvering v. Bullard (1938), 303 U. S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565, indicates
that such a classification would be valid.
RECENT CASE NOTES
combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale
or conversion of capital assets."l It is difficult to include a compromise
settlement of a will contest within this definition since there has been no
capital invested, gain from labor, nor actual exchange of capital assets, unless
the claim of the contestant, even if only a nuisance value, is considered to
constitufe an asset of exchangeable value.2 It was expected that the Supreme
Court would determine in the case at bar whether or not these receipts came
under this definition of income and thereby settle the conflicting decisions
prevailing in the lower federal courts;3 but the Supreme Court avoided the
issue by finding such acquisition of property was not taxable because of the
exemption of "property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance." 4
Because of the presence of a bargain there is sufficient indication of the
lack of a pure gratuity to preclude application of the gift exemption. The
words "bequest" and "devise" are limited to the passing of property (per-
sonalty and realty respectively) to a person named by the decedent in his
will, and thus a will contest settlement cannot come under these terms.
"Inheritance" however, is not so readily defined and, although most times
used to mean intestate succession has also been conmmonly used to cover
both "bequest" and "devise".5 The present case necessitates a determination
of whether or not "inheritance" includes property receivd in a compromise
settlement of a will contest. On this question, the state courts have differed
in the. interpretation of their own tax laws. In some states, including Massa-
chusetts, the rule has been stated that such property is derived by contract
and not intestacy; 6 others have considered such property to be received by
inheritance.7 This raises the inquiry of whether the term so used in the
Revenue Act has reference to some uniform meaning in common throughout
the United States, or whether its meaning is a matter dependent upon the
local law of the state or domicil of decedent. In other words, shall local
law be used in the interpretation of this exemption in our Federal Revenue
Act?8
lEisner v. Macomber (1920), 252 U. S. 189, 207; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co. (1918), 247 U. S. 179; Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1913), 231
U. S. 399. Also see I Paul & Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation
(1934) Ch. 5.
2 The right to inherit is not a natural or absolute right, but the creation
of statute law, Jones v. Jones (1914), 234 U. S. 615.
3 Sterling v. Comm'r. (1937), 93 F. (2d) 304, holding entire sum received
under the compromise as taxable income. Magruder v. Segebade (1938), 94
F. (2d) 177, to the effect that distributees under a prior will who compro-
mised their objections to the probate of a later will for a sum paid, did not
thereby receive income within the Sixteenth Amendment. Also see Lyeth
v. Hoey (1937), 20 F. Supp. 619, and reversal in (1937) 96 F. (2d) 141.
4 Revenue Act of 1938, See. 22 (3).
r Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd Revision (1914): "A perpetuity in lands
to a man and his heirs; the right to succeed to the estate of a person who
dies intestate." Black's Law Dictionary: "An estate which has descended
to the heir and has been cast upon him by the single operation of law."
6Ellis v. Hunt (1917), 228 Mass. 39, 43, 116 N. E. 956; Matter of Cook
(1907), 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991, MacKenzie v. Wright (1927), 31 Ariz.
272, 252 P. 521.
7 Taylor v. State (1929), 40 Ga. App. 295, 149 S. E. 321, Pepper's Estate
(1894), 159 Pa. 508, 28 A. 353.
8 Note that this involves the interpretation of a Federal Statute and not
the application of state rules in Federal Courts as was the problem in Erie
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Although there has been no Supreme Court decision prior to the instant
case interpreting !'inheritance" under the federal income tax act, the appli-
cability of state laws to the construction of federal tax statutes has been
involved in many cases. The cases may be classified into three categories.
In the first are those in which state laws control because the federal taxing
act by express language makes its operations dependent upon state law.9
In the second class are those in which the statute expressly defines its mean-
ing.' 0 Then, in the third group, are the cases such as the one at bar, in
which the statute is in need of interpretation without any specific intention
stated by Congress.
The cases in this latter group superficially appear to be divided, but upon
close scrutiny can be distinguished. Among those cases that seem to hold
that state law should be used are the cases involving the income of husband
and wife in community property states. In taxing this income, the Supreme
Court has looked to the law of the state to determine the interest of the
wife with resulting differences because of the divergencies in the legal doctrine
of the community property states.1 1 But these cases may be explained in
that the reference to local law is to determine ownership of the income and
not strictly an interpretation of the federal act. In determining the meaning
of "insurance company" and "building and loan association" in the Revenue
Act, the Supreme Court, in United States 'u. Cambridge Loan and Bldg. Co., 1 2
held that if a corporation was a building and loan association under the
laws of the state of incorporation, it was also under the Revenue Act, but then
limited this broad statement by adding, "unless a gross misuse of the name."
In apparent conflict is the court's later opinion in Bowers V. Lawyers Mortg.
Co.,13 holding that although the petitioner was organized under the New
York Insurance Law it will not come under the class taxed as "insurance
companies" under the Revenue Act, for too much of the companies' business
was not properly pertaining to that of an insurance company.1 4 The court
distinguished the Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co. case in that there was no
gross abuse of the name "building and loan association"; however, it may
also be distinguished in that the act used the word "domestic" and also
because the court actually inquired into the business of the loan company
and in reality did not apply the state rule.
On the other hand, there are many cases which emphatically hold that
words used in the federal acts are to be interpreted solely in the light of
R. R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 302 U. S. 671, 58 S. Ct. 817. Also see
Kightlinger, Swift v. Tyson Overruled, 13 Indiana L. J. 564.
9 An example of this is Sec. 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1938, which
in defining reorganization refers to "a statutory merger or consolidation,"
meaning consolidation accomplished pursuant to the provision of state law.
Such variations in application do not infringe the constitutional prohibitions
against delegation of taxing power or the requirement of geographical
uniformity. Florida v. Mellon (1927), 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265.
10 See Sec. 115 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1938 defining "dividend".
11 See Poe v. Seaborn (1930), 282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58; United States
v. Robbins (1925), 269 U. S. 315, 46 S. Ct.; United States v. Malcolm (1930),
282, U. S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184.
12 (1928), 278 U. S. 55, 49 S. Ct. 39.
13 (1932), 285 U. S. 182, 52 S. Ct. 350.
14 See United States v. Home Title Ins. Co. (1932), 285 U. S. 191, 52
S. Ct. 319.
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congressional intent of the ordinary meaning, and be given a construction
which will be applicable uniformly throughout the country, irrespective of
the particular local meaning. As the court stated in refusing a tax deduction,
"It does not matter that in Ohio where the property lies, these long leases
are treated as in many respects like a conveyance of the fee. The Act
of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of local law."1 5 An example
of the court's refusal to accept the local classification of a business entity
was its upholding of corporate taxes upon businesses that the state classified
as partnerships.16 The necessity for interpretation of our tax laws in the
absence of language evidencing a different purpose so as to give an uniform
application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation was also brought out by the
Supreme Court in Burnet u. Harmel,17 limiting the application of state law
to the federal taxing acts when by express language or necessary implication
the act makes its own operation dependent upon state law. In the same
decision the court epitomized the law by stating, "The state law creates
!egal interests but the federal statutes determine when and how they shall
be taxed." Or stated otherwise, the state decisions fixing title and legal right
to property are controlling upon the Federal Courts,1 8 but state decisions as
to the character of devolution of a decedent's estate, or determining whether
property received is income or capital, are not controlling on the Federal
Courts in the administration of the Federal Revenue Laws.1 9
The considerations favoring uniformity of construction, in so far as
constitutionally possible are numerous and overpowering. The inherent in-
justice of permitting taxpayers in the same economic stratum to be affected
differently by the same federal statute is evident in itself. In the noted
case, the Supreme Court, realizing this need for uniformity, has rightfully
refused to consider the local law by interpreting the exemption of "inheritance"
in the Federal Income Tax to include property acquired by compromise of a
will contest, and thereby establishing a construction which will be applicable
uniformly throughout the country. I. K.
TORT LIABILrT WrTHouT PRIVITy-INSTALLATION OF IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS
INSTRUMENTALrrY.-The defendant negligently installed a furnace in the
plaintiff's dance hall under a contract with the tenant in possession. The
installation was completed and the work was accepted by the tenant. Some
time later when the first fire was built in the furnace the building caught
fire and considerable damage was sustained. For the negligent installation
the landlord sued the defendant who contended there was no liability without
privity. Held, the furnace was so negligently installed as to be imminently
dangerous to third persons and thus the defendant is liable for the damage
to the plaintiff's property. Nauracaj v. Holland Furnace Co. (Ind. 1938), 14
N. E. (2d) 339.
15 Weiss v. Wiener (1928), 279 U. S. 333, 337, 49 S. Ct. 337.
16Burk-Waggoner Oil Assoc. v. Hopkins (1925), 269 U. S. 110, 46
S. Ct. 48.
17 (1932), 287 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 74.
I8 See cases cited in note 11, supra.
19 See Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (1938) Ch. 1. Also
Barton, Effect of State Laws on Federal Tax Laws (1931), 10 Tax Mag. 11.
